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Abstract 
 
In India, millions of female foetuses have been aborted since the 1980s 
alongside an abnormally high infant girl mortality rate; this has generated 
a  vast literature exploring the root causes of son preference. The 
literature is sparse, however, on how the decisions to abort or neglect 
girls are made. This paper examines mothers’ and fathers’ respective 
roles behind those decisions. Using NFHS-3 data, we show that sex-
selective abortions are most commonly used if both spouses or if only the 
fathers prefer sons, while sex-selective neglect is used if only the 
mothers prefer sons. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Son preference is deeply ingrained in Indian culture. For example, in Tamil Nadu, it is 
not uncommon to name daughters Venda, meaning “don’t want”, and Podum Pennu, 
meaning “enough of daughters” (George 1997) and a common blessing to brides is 
“May you be the mother of a hundred sons” (Iyer 2002), to take only two examples. 
Many factors behind this son preference have been identified by the literature: the dowry 
system, practice of exogamy, cultural rules limiting married daughters’ support to their 
natal family, caste system penalizing the brides’ natal castes, inheritance rules, 
importance of having a son for securing a good afterlife and higher status given to 
mothers of sons than to mothers of daughters (see, for example, Das Gupta (1987), Das 
Gupta et al. (2003) and Dyson and Moore (1983)).1 
While in the past parents preferring sons had to rely on sex-selective neglect or outright 
infanticide to obtain the desired sex-ratio among their children, the advent of ultrasound 
and amniocentesis since the early 1980s now allow them to sex-selectively abort 
daughters, reducing drastically the emotional and physical cost — in terms of depletion 
of the mother’s health — of engineering the sex-ratio among their children.  
Given the strong son preference prevalent in India, this capacity to obtain the desired 
sex-ratio among one’s offspring contributed in a sharp decrease in the overall sex-ratio 
among children less than six years old – from 976 girls per 1000 boys in 1961 to 914 
girls per 1000 boys in 2011 (census data).  
However, despite the availability of drastically less costly methods, some parents still 
rely on sex-selective neglect and infanticide to obtain their desired sex-ratio. This paper 
sheds some light on this conundrum using data from the third National and Family 
Health Survey (NFHS-3) conducted in 2005-2006. 
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We argue that the coexistence of sex-selective abortions – a relatively low cost method 
– alongside sex-selective neglect and infanticide – relatively high cost methods – 
originates from diverging son preference among spouses. 
The literature is generally silent on the role of fathers in the decision to eliminate female 
foetuses/children. Indeed, it is generally taken for granted that the main decision-makers 
when it comes to children are the main care-givers, the mothers. However, given the 
importance of children in one’s life, it would be surprising if fathers have no opinion or 
say in major decisions concerning them. This is likely to be particularly true regarding 
the gender of a child in societies that consider having a son to be of primordial 
importance. 
Focusing on women’s preference is not a problem if the couple agrees on the desired sex-
ratio. However, about 30% of the couples in our sample have diverging preferences. For 
couples that have diverging son preference, we postulate that the control of financial 
resources, mobility and the control of care-giving resources will determine how preference 
for sons is implemented. To test this hypothesis, we analyse the effect of household types 
- that is, both prefer sons, only the father prefers sons, only the mother prefer sons or 
neither prefer sons - on the probability of a child to survive infancy – a measure of sex-
selective discrimination –, on the sex-ratio among the couple’s offspring and on the 
probability that the last birth was a boy – to proxy for sex-selective abortions. While we do 
not have direct measures of sex-selective neglect leading to death and sex-selective 
abortions, we rely on the fact that the natural infant mortality rate and the natural sex-ratio 
at birth among human population are well-known and stable. Thus deviance from the 
natural range can be used to proxy for sex-selective neglect leading to death and sex-
selective abortions. While it is true that other factors may lead to small differences from 
the normal range, for example, the prevalence of Hepatitis B, the impact is very small (see 
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for example Drew et al. 1978) and cannot explain the results we found. It would only be if 
girls’ births are under-reported that we may end up with a sex-ratio at birth outside of the 
normal range without pre-birth sex determination taking place. To limit the extent of this 
problem, the birth history was collected with great care to make sure that all births were 
recorded (IIPS, 2007a, b). Nevertheless, we carry robustness checks to ascertain that our 
results are not driven by underreporting of girls’ births. 
Our results show that couples who share a preference for sons are the most likely to 
resort to sex-selective abortions, followed by couples where only the husband prefers 
sons; whereas, in couples where only the wife has a preference for sons, sex-selective 
neglect is prevalent, a technique not commonly used in any other household type. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The theoretical links between 
spouses’ stated son preference and control of resources with sex-selective abortion and 
infant mortality are developed in section two. The theory is then brought to the data 
using NFHS-3. Section three introduces the dataset and discusses the empirical 
strategy while results are presented in section four. Concluding remarks are presented 
in section five. 
 
2 Theory 
 
The number and gender of children a couple has are their joint decisions. To maximise 
utility, parents will try to reach their ideal sex-ratio at the lowest possible cost.  
The husband and wife try to converge to one preference (peer influence effect, Becker 
and Murphy (2000)) as they don’t want the marriage to dissolve or, more likely in India, 
to become non-cooperative. This cooperation depends on their relative willingness to 
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accommodate and can be attributed to feelings of altruism, with a spouse including 
his/her spouse’s preference in his/her own utility. Another factor could be socialization 
as spouses are likely to spend time together and share thoughts and ideas. 
However, if preferences do not converge the husband and wife bargain over sex-
selective abortion, if this is what he or she desires. The strength of bargaining would 
depend on the control of financial and non-financial resources in the household by each 
spouse. 
If a parent was forced to accept the birth of an unwanted daughter, sex-selective neglect 
leading to death can be used as a final means to achieve the desired sex-ratio.  
A formal model, following Becker (1960), on the number of children as an equilibrium 
solution to joint parental utility maximisation subject to income and cost constraint is 
available in Online Appendix A. Given the preference the number of children will be 
engineered to achieve the desired sex-ratio. This optimal number depends on control of 
financial resources, divergence between son preferences and cost – financial, emotional 
and time – of having children among the parents. 
If preferences match perfectly, any undesired foetus will be aborted and desired 
pregnancies will be carried to term. If preferences do not converge, sex-selective 
abortions will take place only if the spouse with the strongest son preference is able to 
implement his/her preference despite the resistance of his/her spouse. 
If one parent has been forced to accept the birth of an undesired daughter, as a last 
resort the child can be sex-selectively neglected, increasing the odds of death. As this 
method of implementing one’s preference is the most costly, financially, emotionally and 
physically, this method should be implemented only as a last resort. 
We argue that, while the relative bargaining power of spouses will vary from one 
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household to the other, on average men with a strong son preference are more likely to 
be able to implement their preference than women with an equivalently strong son 
preference. The reason is that the financial resources necessary to implement an 
abortion as well as the freedom of movement necessary to go to the clinic are generally 
controlled by the husband, not the wife. However, women being the main care-givers, 
they are the most able to implement their preference post-birth. As infants are frail, small 
neglects, such as taking a little longer to treat diarrhoea or a fever, can easily cause 
death. Therefore, a mother desiring to eliminate an undesired daughter post-birth, can 
easily do so without her spouse necessarily noticing. On the other hand, as men in India 
often play only a minor role as care-giver to new-borns, very few will be able to get rid of 
an undesired daughter without their wife noticing. 
In the next section we will be using data from NFHS-3 to test the following hypothesises:  
1. Sex-selective abortions are more likely to occur when either both parents or the father 
alone prefer sons. 
2. Post-birth solutions, that is, neglect leading to death, should occur when the mother 
alone has a preference for sons. 
 
3 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Strategy 
 
NFHS-3 data is used to empirically test our theory. In the selected households, all 
women aged 15 to 49 were interviewed. For a sub-sample of households, all men aged 
15 to 54 were asked to answer a man-only questionnaire. A total of 74,369 men and 
124,385 women answered the questionnaire, with a response rate of, respectively, 81.7% 
and 94.5% (IIPS 2007a, b). We are able to match husband and wife for 31,940 dyads. 
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Pre-birth solutions – comprising mainly sex-selective abortions but also sperm sorting 
and other devices to alter child’s gender at conception – are measured using the sex-
ratio at birth (33,641 observations) and the gender of the last child. In this later case, the 
data set is limited to children born during the years of the survey (2005-2006) or the year 
before the survey (2004). Each child is matched with his/her parents, leading to a 
sample of 5,227 observations.  
While the proportion of boys born should be around 51% without sex-selective abortions, 
the proportion in our data is higher at 53.4%, implying that some sex-selection before 
birth is taking place. The ratio is even more skewed among the last birth with 54.7% boys.  
Post-birth solutions are proxied by infant survival. Each child aged between one and five 
years old or who died before the age of one is matched with his/her mother and father, 
leading to a sample of 11,060 observations.2 Neglect leading to death is more likely 
soon after birth as new-borns are frailer. Infant boys are particularly frail given the high 
presence of testosterone in the mother’s uterus slows down the growth of the lungs, 
increasing the odds of dying of respiratory problems (Waldron, 1998). As a result, the 
natural sex-ratio of infant mortality is of 1,200 boys for every 1,000 girls (Balsara et al., 
n.d.). The Indian girls’ relative risk of dying during infancy is, however, much larger than 
this figure in many states (Figure 1, Panel D).  
The key explanatory variable, in all models, is the structure of stated son preference in 
the household. We define somebody has having a son preference if the respondent 
states that he/she desires more sons than daughters if he/she could start over his/her 
fertility history.3 
Based on NFHS-3 data, Indian men and women desire on average 1.16 and 1.15 sons 
per daughter, respectively. These numbers are much higher than the normal biological 
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sex-ratio at birth, oscillating between 1.05 and 1.07 boys per girl, giving plenty of scope 
to parents to engineer the sex-ratio among their children. 
This average, however, hides some important variations across India. The Southern 
states have overall much more gender equal preferences than the Northern states 
(Dyson and Moore, 1983) (Figure 1, Panels E and F). 
Supporting the idea that stated son preference is correlated with gender discrimination, 
we observe the same pattern, with more discrimination taking place in the North than in 
the South, for education (Figure 1, Panel A), access to vaccination (Figure 1, Panel B), 
sex-ratio among children less than 6 years old (Figure 1, Panel C) and, to some extent, 
infant mortality (Figure 1, Panel D), to state only some examples.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
We take advantage of the fact that the sex-ratio among their children – alive or not – 
cannot be determined by parents, other than via sex-selective abortions, sex-selective 
neglects or stopping behaviours (that is, to stop having children only when the desired 
number of sons has been reached). Hence, to quantify the level of sex-determination, 
we can simply look at the sex-ratio among children – alive or not, at the time of the 
survey – without any control variables other than the household types. Specifically, 
using OLS, we estimate: 
sr# = w#, κ# + ν#                        (2) 
with sr# , the sex-ratio among children in household h, w a vector of stated son 
preference and ν, the error term.4 We allow for four types of households – households 
where both parents prefer sons, households where only the mother prefers sons, 
households where only the father prefers sons and, as the reference category, 
households where none of the parents prefer sons. 
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While sex-selective abortion is the most cost-effective method to obtain the desired sex-
ratio, when a parent is forced into accepting the birth of a daughter, sex-selective 
neglect, leading to death, or infanticide may be used. We thus estimate a model 
explaining the probability of surviving infancy. As the probability of surviving infancy 
depends on other factors than the structure of stated son preference, control variables 
for biological and socio-economics factors are included. Specifically, using a Probit 
estimator, we estimate: 
s* = z*,γ + w*,ζ + δ*                     (1) 
with, s* , a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a child i has survived infancy, 0 
otherwise; z, a vector of socio-economic and biological factors; w, a vector of stated son 
preference variables defined as before; and, δ, the error term.5 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
 
4.1 Sex-Selective Abortions 
 
The most cost-effective method to eliminate unwanted daughters is to rely on sex-
selective abortion. While sex-selective abortion entails financial, physical and emotional 
costs, which may deter some parents to implement their son preference, those costs are 
fairly modest. Indeed, at between 250 to 1500 Rupees (5-30 USD) (Booth et al., 1994; 
and Vella, 2005) the financial cost of a sex-selective abortion is very low compared to 
the cost of raising and marrying off an unwanted daughter. Similarly, an abortion is 
unlikely to be as demanding physically as to carry a foetus to term and entails a much 
lower mortality risk (Ronsmans and Graham, 2006). We do not have a very good proxy 
for emotional cost; however, in India, abortions are fairly common – 6.5 million abortions 
were carried out in 2006 (Sinha, 2012) – and well accepted as a fertility control method. 
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Therefore, for many parents, the emotional cost also will be relatively low. 
Given its relatively low cost, parents with a preference for sons should use sex-selective 
abortion as their first choice method of implementing their preference. There are 
however good reasons to believe that not all parents willing to seek a sex-selective 
abortion will be able to do so. Indeed, to carry a sex-selective abortion one needs cash 
and the ability to go to an abortion clinic. We argue that for many women those two pre-
conditions will not be met. Indeed, in our sample, 26% of women cannot take decisions 
alone regarding their own health, 92% cannot take a decision alone regarding large 
household purchase and 60% need to ask permission to visit family or friends. Moreover, 
despite the fact that the law does not require the husband’s permission for a woman to 
undertake an abortion,  Ganatra et al. (2001) find that in Maharashtra, a state with 
moderate patriarchal culture, 27% of women who underwent a sex-selective abortion 
had to provide their husband’s written consent to their health provider. Thus, for many 
women, husband’s agreement would be necessary to obtain a sex-selective abortion; 
agreement which is unlikely to be given if the husband does not share his wife’s stated 
son preference. We thus postulate that sex-selective abortions will be more prevalent in 
households in which the father has a stated son preference, either alone or in 
conjunction with his wife.  
The results for the model explaining the sex-ratio at birth are presented in Table 1. 
Looking at Column 1, we note that the sex-ratios are particularly skewed in households 
where both parents have a preference for sons, followed by households where only the 
mother has a preference for sons, then by households where only the father has a 
preference for sons and, finally, by households where none of the parents expresses a 
preference for sons. In the latter case, the sex-ratio is normal. All the coefficients are 
statistically significantly different from each other. 
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Under-reporting of birth of girls is known to occur in India though NFHS reports careful 
attentiveness while collecting the data to ensure that all children are reported in the birth 
history (IIPS, 2007a, b). As a robustness check, to eliminate the risk of under reporting 
bias, the model was also estimated using the gender of the last birth, limiting the sample 
to children who were born in the last 3 years, making it less likely that the mother had 
time to forget the birth. 
Moreover, our model may suffer from reverse causality since, as previously mentioned, 
it is possible that parents are influenced by the sex-ratio that they have at the time of 
stating their son preference. As long as we assume that this ex-post rationalization 
affects both parents in the same way, this bias would not change our key results. 
However, to be on the safe side, as a robustness check, we use the fact that the gender 
of the last child should not determine the stated desired sex-ratio as strongly as the 
gender of all children already born since the last child is one among many.6 Hence, we 
estimate the same model as before, but this time we use the gender of the last child – 
born between 2001 and 2006 – as dependent variable. The conclusion remains as 
before, with the only exception that there is no more statistically significant difference 
between households where only the mother prefers sons and households where only 
the father prefers sons. Thus, the households that are the most likely to see the birth of 
a boy are those, in order, where both parents prefer sons, the father or the mother only 
prefers sons (those two coefficients are not statistically significantly different), followed, 
at last, by households where neither of the parents expresses a preference for sons 
(Table 1, Column 2).7 The limit of this approach is that parents may be more likely to 
stop child-bearing after the birth of a son, which inflates the sex-ratio among the last 
birth. 
To deal with this issue, we limit the sample to births in the years of the survey (2005-
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2006) and the preceding year (2004). For that restricted sample, stopping behaviours 
should play a lesser role as the short time span makes it unlikely that more than one 
birth was carried to term.8 Reassuringly, we reach the same conclusions as before 
(Table 1, Column 3) with the notable exception that women’s stated son preference is 
no longer statistically significant. This supports the conclusion that women are less able 
than men to use sex-selective abortions when their husband has no preference for sons. 
[Table 1 about here] 
4.1 Sex-Selective Infant Mortality 
 
 
Parents who were forced to accept the birth of an unwanted daughter may decrease the 
odds of her surviving via sex-selective neglect. As infants are very frail, small neglects, 
such as taking longer to treat diarrhoea or a fever, may lead to death. Those small 
neglects may easily go unnoticed by household members other than the main care-giver, 
who is usually the mother. We thus argue that sex-selective infant mortality is more 
likely to occur in households in which the mother alone has a son preference, as in 
households in which the father has a son preference, sex-selective abortion will have 
been sought, as it is the most cost-effective method to engineer sex-ratio. 
Starting with simple descriptive statistics, we note that the relative risks of dying in 
infancy – the ratio of boys on 1000 girls dying in infancy – are particularly biased toward 
girls when their mother prefers sons, followed by when both parents prefer for sons and, 
then, when only the father prefers sons. It is, however, normal in households where 
none prefer sons (Table 2). Hence, the influence of the fathers’ stated son preference on 
infant survival appears to be much smaller than the influence of the mothers’. 
While these statistics are interesting, they cannot prove a causal link between mothers’ 
and fathers’ stated son preference and girls’ lower odds of surviving infancy. For this, we 
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need to turn to regression analysis. 
The results are presented in Table 3 – Probit coefficient (Column 1) and marginal effects 
(Column 2) – and Table 4 – predicted probability to die in infancy. In households where 
only the father has a preference for sons, the relative mortality risk of boys and girls is 
normal (1183 boys, rather than the American norm of 1200, to every 1000 girls). 
However in all other household types, girls are at a higher relative risk of dying than 
what should be the case without discrimination. The relative mortality risk is particularly 
unfavourable in households where only the mother has a preference for sons, with girls 
being twice more at risk of dying during infancy than boys. 
 [Tables 2 to 4 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our results show a far more interesting and complex dynamic between spouses in the 
exercise of son preference, than has been recognized in the literature. The literature on 
son preference generally focuses on women’s stated preferences.  While it is widely 
recognized that the fathers’ preferences matter, it is typically assumed that these 
preferences will be fully captured in women’s responses and behaviour – as women are 
pressured to comply with their husbands’ preferences.  
Our findings indicate that fathers play a stronger role in decisions to abort. If they have 
lower son preference than their wives, they often seem to have a veto on the decision to 
abort.  We argue that this veto comes from men’s control over financial resources and 
limited female mobility since money to pay for the ultrasound and the capacity to go to an 
abortion clinic are both necessary to implement a sex-selective abortion. Our results also 
show that for households in which the husband has a stronger son preference than his 
wife, the woman may be coerced into having an abortion.  
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We also find that if women have higher son preference than their husbands, they are able 
to manipulate their child-care towards achieving their preferences. Since women are the 
primary care-givers for children, fathers may not be able to stop their wife to eliminate 
unwanted daughters. While our data show that women have difficulties to obtain a sex-
selective abortion without their husband’s consent, they also show that women are able to 
sex-selectively neglect daughters, leading to a higher girl mortality rate in households 
where only the mother has a stated son preference. 
The results shed light on the importance of communication/bargaining in the household. 
Many decisions, such as sex-selective abortions or sending children to school, are likely to 
be discussed among adult household members. Hence, while many studies focus on 
women’s preference and characteristics to explain children’s outcomes and well-being, 
this study shows that this leaves out an important decision-maker and influential person, 
the father. More care should be given in collecting data and analysing fathers’ role in 
decisions regarding their children as well as on how the bargaining process take place in 
households where the couple disagrees. 
Our findings have an important implication for policy-makers in India and in other countries 
where son preference has led to skewed sex ratios.  Focusing on banning sex-selective 
abortions will not eliminate the problem of imbalanced sex-ratio. While sex-selective 
abortions have made it easier to eliminate unwanted daughters, our results show that 
some mothers — and also very likely fathers if abortions were to become infeasible — are 
willing to sex-selectively neglect their daughters to death. A solution must thus include a 
change in people’s preference.  
 
																																								 																				
1	Many	of	these	reasons	to	prefer	sons	are	also	an	artifact	of	son	preference.	For	example,	the	high	status	
enjoyed	by	mothers	of	son	increases	the	utility	of	having	sons,	but	the	reason	why	having	a	son	increases	
women’s	status	is	because	of	the	ingrained	son	preference	in	the	community.	Similarly,	the	desire	to	have	a	
son	to	inherit	the	ancestral	land	comes	from	the	tradition	that	deprives	women	from	land	ownership.	
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2	If	a	child	is	to	be	neglected	to	death,	it	is	rational	to	do	so	as	early	as	possible	so	as	to	limit	unnecessary	
investment	–	such	as	time	and	food	—	on	the	child	and	to	limit	emotional	attachment.	It	is	also	easier	to	
conceal	infanticide	and	blatant	neglect	early	in	life	as	the	mortality	risk	is	at	its	highest;	hence	our	focus	on	
infant	mortality.	
3	The	relevant	questions	in	NFHS-3	are:	“If	you	could	go	back	to	the	time	you	did	not	have	any	children	and	
could	choose	exactly	the	number	of	children	to	have	in	your	whole	life,	how	many	would	that	be?”	and	“How	
many	of	these	children	would	you	like	to	be	boys,	how	many	would	you	like	to	be	girls	and	for	how	many	
would	it	not	matter?”.		
4	It	is	common	in	the	literature	to	look	at	the	sex-ratio	of	the	last	birth	while	studying	sex-selective	abortions.	
Focusing	on	the	last	birth	helps	deal	with	issues	we	will	discuss	later	on.	It	should	however	be	kept	in	mind	that	
the	sex-ratio	of	the	last	birth	is	an	inflated	measure	of	the	level	of	gender	imbalance	in	the	population	as	many	
parents	are	willing	to	let	faith	determines	the	gender	of	their	first	born	(Jha	et	al.	2006),	parents	are	more	
likely	to	stop	childbearing	after	the	birth	of	a	son	(Arnold	et	al.	2002)	and	some	parents	may	shorten	birth	
spacing	after	the	birth	of	a	girl,	in	the	hope	of	having	a	son	(Arnold	et	al.	1998).	
5 Descriptive	statistics	for	the	dependent	and	the	 independent	variables	are	presented	 in	Online	Appendix	B	
while	variables’	descriptions	are	available	in	Appendix	C.	 
6	In	a	model	explaining	the	percentage	of	boys	desired	if	the	respondent	could	start	over	his/her	fertility	
history,	estimated	using	OLS	and	controlling	only	for	the	sex-ratio	of	ever	born	children	and	the	gender	of	the	
last	child,	we	conclude,	for	both	men	and	women,	that	the	sex-ratio	of	ever	born	children	is	a	significant	
determinant,	but	not	the	gender	of	the	last	child	in	the	case	of	the	men’s	equation;	while,	in	the	case	of	
women,	having	had	a	boy	as	a	last	birth	reduces	the	percentage	of	boys	desired	(results	available	on	request).	
7	Given	the	dichotomous	nature	of	the	dependent	variable,	a	Probit	model	would	have	been	more	appropriate.	
However,	the	use	of	OLS	has	the	advantage	of	allowing	us	to	interpret	directly	the	constant.	As	a	robustness	
check	the	model	was	also	estimated	using	Probit.	The	main	conclusions	remain	(results	available	on	request).	
8	It	is	however	possible	that	parents	who	had	a	daughter	but	are	desperate	for	a	son,	may	end	up	with	very	
short	birth	spacing.		
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	Table 1: OLS: Sex-ratio and gender of the last child: Influence 
of parents’ stated son preference 
 
 Sex-ratio Male Male 
(2004-2006) 
Both Parents Prefer Sons 0.0970*** 0.0819*** 0.0826*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0156) (0.0230) 
Mother Only Prefers Sons 0.0695*** 0.0577*** 0.0339 
 (0.0052) (0.0137) (0.0208) 
Father Only Prefers Sons 0.0526*** 0.0705*** 0.0619*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0132) (0.0197) 
Constant 0.5083*** 0.5211*** 0.5166*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0058) (0.0087) 
Observation 33,641 11,793 5,227 
R-squared 0.0111 0.0046 0.0036 
Notes: Standard errors, in parenthesis, are adjusted for cluster at the 
primary sampling unit level. ***, p-value<0.01, **p-value<0.05 and 
*p-value<0.10. For ease of interpretation, OLS was used for all 
models.  
	 
 
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 
 
	

Table 2: Relative mortality rate – number of boys dying in  
infancy per 1000 girls’ infant death – by mothers’ and 
fathers’ stated son preference. 
Mother 
 
 
No Son Preference Son 
Preference 
Note: The numbers of observations are in parenthesis. 
  
	 
Table 3: Probit: Infant survival (<1 year). 
 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
 Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Rural 0.0592 0.0076 Media: At Least Once a Week -0.0888 -0.0114 
 
(0.0561) (0.0071)  (0.0551) (0.0078) 
Religion: Christianity -0.0738 -0.0094 Age (in Years) 0.0151*** 0.0019*** 
 
(0.1087) (0.0140)  (0.0047) (0.0007) 
Religion: Islam 0.0636 0.0081 Nuclear Household 0.0600 0.0077 
 
(0.0706) (0.0094)  (0.0454) (0.0056) 
Religion: Other 0.0194 0.0025 Twin -0.8261*** -0.1056*** 
 
(0.1247) (0.0160)  (0.1532) (0.0281) 
Scheduled Caste -0.0056 -0.0007 Previous Birth <12 months -0.4351*** -0.0556*** 
 
(0.0679) (0.0087)  (0.1226) (0.0189) 
Scheduled Tribe -0.0178 -0.0023 Antenatal Care 0.1011* 0.0129* 
 
(0.0899) (0.0115)  (0.0588) (0.0075) 
Backward Caste 0.0421 0.0054 Mother’s BMI -0.0204*** -0.0026** 
 
(0.0601) (0.0075)  (0.0069) (0.0010) 
Don’t Know Caste 0.0949 0.0121 Female 0.0406 0.0052 
 
(0.1363) (0.0177)  (0.0563) (0.0072) 
Wealth Quintile: Poorest -0.0232 -0.0030 Both Parents Prefer Sons -0.0471 -0.0060 
 
(0.0764) (0.0096)  (0.0918) (0.0118) 
Wealth Quintile: Poorer 0.0198 0.0025 Both Parents Prefer Sons * Female -0.0355 -0.0045 
 
(0.0673) (0.0087)  (0.1420) (0.0187) 
Wealth Quintile: Richer 0.1990*** 0.0254** Mother Only Prefers Sons 0.1878** 0.0240* 
 
(0.0676) (0.0108)  (0.0936) (0.0125) 
Wealth Quintile: Richest 0.3235*** 0.0414*** Mother Only Prefers Sons * Female -0.3822*** -0.0489*** 
 
(0.0912) (0.0151)  (0.1266) (0.0184) 
Mother’s Education (in Years) 0.0184*** 0.0024** Father Only Prefers Sons -0.0192 -0.0025 
 
(0.0066) (0.0009)  (0.0839) (0.0108) 
Father’s Education (in Years) 0.0065 0.0008 Father Only Prefers Sons * Female 0.0440 0.0056 
 
(0.0061) (0.0008)  (0.1273) (0.0163) 
Mobility: Allowed to Go Alone 0.0916* 0.0117* Constant 1.2247***  
 
(0.0509) (0.0071)  (0.1994)  
State’s Fixed Effects    Yes Yes 
Observations    11,204 11,204 
 
Notes: The marginal effect has been obtained holding all continuous variables at their mean, for dummy variables taking the value of the 
most likely outcome and taking the case of a household where both parents prefer sons. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are adjusted for 
cluster at the primary sampling unit level. ***, p-value<0.01, **p-value<0.05 and *p-value<0.10. 
  
	Table 4: Predicted infant mortality rate per 100 live birth by gender 
and family type 
 
 Boys Girls Boys/Girls 
Both Parents Prefer Sons 6.64 6.57 1011 
 [3.84 - 9-44] [3.33 - 9.81]  
Mother Only Prefers Sons 4.11 8.12 506 
 [2.08 - 6.14] [4.94 - 11.31]  
Father Only Prefers Sons 6.28 5.31 1183 
 [3.60 - 8.96] [2.64 - 7.97]  
None Prefers Sons 6.05 5.58 1084 
 [4.02 - 8.08] [3.63 - 7.53]  
Notes: The predicted probability have been obtained holding all 
continuous variables at their mean and for dummy variables taking the 
value of the most likely outcome. Confidence interval at the 5% level 
are in brackets. 
	Figure 1: The spatial distribution of gender discrimination 
Panel A: Ratio of boys on girls aged 6-14 attending school  Panel B: Ratio of the number of vaccines received by boys to 
that received by girls less than 5 years old 
Panel C: Sex-ratio 
   
Panel D: Ratio of boys on girls who died during infancy Panel E: Women’s stated son preference Panel F: Men’s stated son preference 
   
Source: For schooling, vaccination, infant mortality and stated son preference: NFHS-3 (authors’ calculation). For sex-ratio: 2011 Indian Census (authors’ 
calculation. 
 
